Looking back on “How Microsoft Lost the API War”

I was just browsing the web, looking for some info on Raymond Chen when I came across an old article written by Joel Spolsky that had been featured on Slashdot a while back. In Joel’s article, he writes:

The old Microsoft, the Microsoft of Raymond Chen, might have implemented things like Avalon, the new graphics system, as a series of DLLs that can run on any version of Windows and which could be bundled with applications that need them. There’s no technical reason not to do this. But Microsoft needs to give you a reason to buy Longhorn, and what they’re trying to pull off is a sea change, similar to the sea change that occurred when Windows replaced DOS. The trouble is that Longhorn is not a very big advance over Windows XP; not nearly as big as Windows was over DOS. It probably won’t be compelling enough to get people to buy all new computers and applications like they did for Windows.

Interestingly, it’s been announced since then that Avalon (in addition to many other technologies, such as WinFX and WinFS) will be available on Windows XP. Does this mean that Microsoft Won the API War? Regardless, one thing that Joel misunderstands is why new copies of Windows actually get sold. It’s not due to new features and doo-dads (though that helps to a certain extent). I actually asked a Microsoft VP a very similar question: What’s the motivation for anyone to buy Windows Longhorn Vista? The answer can be found in the market for the Windows OS. Who really buys the vast majority of Microsoft’s consumer OS’s?

~Tim

Comments

  1. Chris says:

    In case anyone didn’t bother to read the article (and if you’re a developer, you should), the article specifically answers Gas’s last question:

    Microsoft grew up during the 1980s and 1990s, when the growth in personal computers was so dramatic that every year there were more new computers sold than the entire installed base. That meant that if you made a product that only worked on new computers, within a year or two it could take over the world even if nobody switched to your product. That was one of the reasons Word and Excel displaced WordPerfect and Lotus so thoroughly: Microsoft just waited for the next big wave of hardware upgrades and sold Windows, Word and Excel to corporations buying their next round of desktop computers (in some cases their first round). So in many ways Microsoft never needed to learn how to get an installed base to switch from product N to product N+1. When people get new computers, they’re happy to get all the latest Microsoft stuff on the new computer, but they’re far less likely to upgrade. This didn’t matter when the PC industry was growing like wildfire, but now that the world is saturated with PCs most of which are Just Fine, Thank You, Microsoft is suddenly realizing that it takes much longer for the latest thing to get out there. When they tried to “End Of Life” Windows 98, it turned out there were still so many people using it they had to promise to support that old creaking grandma for a few more years.

    I’m not gonna say whether this helps or hurts Tim’s argument, because I haven’t decided and don’t know, and I can think of reasons it could go either way. At this point, I think MS’s biggest strength is its willingness to reinvent itself and not rest on its product base.

  2. Tim says:

    There’s only one problem with Joel’s answer:

    Microsoft just waited for the next big wave of hardware upgrades and sold Windows, Word and Excel to corporations buying their next round of desktop computers

    Usually, new versions of windows sold to the consumer desktop market because of the OEM’s slapping the newest version of windows onto the boxes. Corporations, however, generally purchase site licenses instead of OEM licenses. (BOCTAOE; some consumers buy Windows retail, and some corporations just get windows from their OEM)

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